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NOTE
THE NEXT CHAPTER IN THE TAKING OF
JUDICIAL POWER FROM THE TRIBES:




Many legal scholars describe the present United States
American Indian Policy as reflecting a time of self
determination.' They believe the court's rulings further tribal
sovereignty by promoting tribal self-determination. However, a
closer look at the holdings of the major cases in the area of
Indian Law show self determination is no longer, or may never
have been, the trend. Instead, the federal courts have returned
to the age-old concept of tribal assimilation. This trend is
evidenced by a long line of court decisions which remove tribal
plaintiffs from the tribal court system and place their cases into
the federal court system.2 The most recent case in this line of
1. See generally FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard
Strickland et al., eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK]; DAVID H. GETCHES, ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4th ed. West Group 1998)
(1979).
2. These cases will be explained in great detail infra Part III.
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decisions is Burlington Northern Railroad v. Red Wolf decided
by the Ninth Circuit.
This case note will examine how the Supreme Court's
holdings on tribal civil jurisdiction in the last twenty years
inevitably led to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Red Wolf
Specifically, this note addresses how the decision in Red Wolf
has improperly broadened the scope of federal jurisdiction over
civil claims arising on tribal lands at the expense of tribal
sovereignty. In effect, Red Wolf severely limits a tribe's ability
to adjudicate actions that arise within the boundaries of its
reservation.
Part II of this note gives an overview of the history of
United State's federal Indian policies, including legislation
which has significantly affected the Native American
population, as well as the major United States Supreme Court
decisions on Indian Law issues. Part III discusses the evolution
of tribal civil jurisdiction over the last twenty years. The cases
analyzed in this part are crucial to the development of an
understanding of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Red Wolf. Part
IV discusses Red Wolfs facts and procedural history. As the
procedural history is discussed, it will become clear how this
case is not only a continuation of past Supreme Court decisions,
but a huge leap of logic, resulting in diminished tribal
sovereignty.
Part V addresses the various issues raised by the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Red Wolf The analysis focuses on how the
Ninth Circuit could have easily distinguished Red Wolf from the
cited Supreme Court cases in order to protect Indian sovereignty
and further the goal of self-determination. This includes an
analysis of how the Ninth Circuit substantially broadened the
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strate v. A-
1 Contractors.4  Part VI discusses the Ninth Circuit's
problematic decision with an eye to social policy. The fact that
the legal analysis is based on law and procedure from the late
1800's opposes society's view on promoting Indian sovereignty.
In the past, the Court has used society's view as a basis for
interpreting Indian law. They are failing to do this today. Part
VII looks at the effect Red Wolf is already having on Montana
courts. The conclusion summarizes how the Ninth Circuit could
have distinguished Red Wolf from the cited Supreme Court
3. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
4. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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decisions.
II. HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY5
An understanding of tribal civil jurisdiction must be gained
within its historical context.6 There are a few distinct reasons
for this. First, much of the legislation and case law surrounding
tribal civil jurisdiction is based upon the specific treaties
governing the tribal land.7 Whenever a treaty is in question, it
must be interpreted. Evidence of the tribe's historical
understanding of a treaty, as well as the historical
understanding of that treaty by the United States, the tribe's
bargaining strength, the intent of a treaty, possible language
difficulties, and the authority of the negotiators all affect efforts
to interpret that treaty.8 Without an understanding of such
factors, it would be impossible for a court today to interpret the
treaty in its appropriate context.9
Second, understanding this historical context is central to
understanding the doctrinal development of tribal civil
jurisdiction. 10  Six major periods in the United States'
development in tribal policy have been identified: Pre-
Revolution; The Formative Years; Allotments and Assimilation;
Reorganization; Termination; and, Self Determination." Most
writers within the tribal policy field follow these six categories
in some way. Each of the six categories identifies major trends
5. The history of Indian Policy is an extensive and important field of study. This
Section is meant only to give the reader a brief introduction into the polices. For further
study see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1; OREN LYONS, et. al., EXILED IN
THE LAND OF THE FREE (Chief Oren Lyons & John Mohawk eds. 1992); FREDRICK E.
HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920
(1984); DONALD L. FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN
POLICY: 1945-1960 (1986); BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION:
JEFFERSONIAN PHILANTHROPY AND THE AMERICAN (1973).
6. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 48.
7. Id.
8. Id.; See also Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) which
states when court construe Indian treaties, they should "look beyond the written words
to the history of the treaty." The fact that this type of evidence is no longer taken into
consideration by today's Supreme Court will be shown infra Part III.
9. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 49. To see how a court uses these
factors, see United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 48-49.
11. See generally id. at 47-206. There are many writers that disagree with the
assessment that we are still in a time of self-determination. A few of those writers will
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In the beginning of European settlement, the colonists
arrived to face the hardships of carving out a new life. They
were far outnumbered by the Indian population that already
existed in the "New World."12 Many of the tribes had homes,
farmlands and intricate systems of government. 13  These
colonists learned to fear and respect the numbers and warlike
nature of the Indian tribes. 14 The European settler's fear and
respect lead to a desire to have smooth relations with their
neighbors. 15 Therefore, each tribe was treated as a sovereign
nation.' 6 The various agreements made between the settlers
and the tribes before the Revolutionary War reflected this
belief. 17
For example, in 1660, the head of the United Netherlands
directed the Dutch West India Company to obtain all settlement
land only with tribal consent.'8 English colonists followed
comparable purchase practices.' 9 Soon, most of the colonies
adopted similar laws for the purchase of Indian lands.20
When the colonists formed a new nation, The United States
of America, the Founding Fathers did not forget the American
Indian tribes that supported them in their bid for freedom. 21 In
1787, Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance. 22  This
Ordinance promised "the utmost good faith... toward the
Indians, their lands and property," in the exercising of the
12. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 55.
13. LYONS, supra note 5, at 33-39. This discusses the origins of the very intricate
political and cultural beginning of the Iroquois Nations. This political alliance based on
peace was in place long before the first Europeans set foot in "America."
14. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 56.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 55.
17. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN
INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 103-05, 110-13 (1997).
18. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 53.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 53-54.
21. HAROLD E. FEY & DARCY MCNICKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERICANS, 55
(1970). As one of its first acts, the Continental Congress appointed a committee to
negotiate with the Indians and on July 12, 1775, resolved "That the securing and
preserving the friendship of Indian nations, appears to be a subject of the utmost
moment to these Colonies. . ." Id.
22. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 62.
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United States sovereign right to buy Indian lands.23 This was
ratified in Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution, commonly known as
the Indian Commerce Clause.24 Unfortunately, Congress would
not heed its promise to treat the Indian tribes with the utmost
good faith.
B. Formative Years (1789-1871)
The formative years were a time of treaty making and
treaty breaking.2 5 The United States government used treaties
as the primary tool for managing the Indian tribes. 26 The
United States used treaties to negotiate with the Indian tribes
that supported the British during the Revolutionary War.2 7
These tribes were deemed sovereign nations only up to a certain
point.28 However, they were also seen as under the protection of
the United States.29 Thus, an accommodative balance was
struck between Indian sovereignty and the United States'
protection of the Indian peoples. This balance would be
extended to all the tribes in the United States.
One of the most famous examples of this balance is the
Treaty of Hopewell between the Cherokee and the United
States.30  The treaty embodied fundamental principles. The
Cherokees acknowledged they were "under the protection of the
United States of America, and of no other sovereign
whatsoever."31 The treaty guaranteed that only tribal members
were to settle on the reservation. 32 Congress was granted the
sole right to regulate commerce with the Cherokees. 33 In return,
the United States agreed to punish any of its citizens who
23. Id.
24. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have power.. to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States and with the Indian Tribes."
25. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 62-70.
26. Id. at 62.
27. DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1-2 (Francis Paul Prucha
ed., 2d ed. 1990); Letter from George Washington to James Duane (September 7, 1783).
28. Id.
29. Id. Washington's recommendations in this letter were quickly adopted with
very few changes by the Congress's Select Committee on Indian Affairs (1783). These
policies established the framework for the U.S. Indian treaties and Trade and
Intercourse Acts. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS: INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, 2 (1932).
30. Treaty of Hopewell, November 28, 1785 (reprinted DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, 6-8 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990)).
31. Treaty of Hopewell, supra note 30, at Art. III.
32. Id. atArt. V.
33. Id. at Art. IX.
2001 343
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committed a capital crime against any Indian, as if the
aggressor had harmed a citizen of the United States. 34 By
signing the treaty, the Cherokees gave up many of its sovereign
rights in order to live in peace with the United States.
The treaties made with the Indian Nations granted them
vast portions of land. However, the non-Indians hungered for
the rich and fertile land reserved to the Indian tribes.35 The non-
Indian's attitude of cultural superiority justified their plans to
dispossess the Indians.36 Because many were violating treaties
and invading Indian territory, Congress decided that a federal
regulation was needed in order to manage Indian affairs. 37
To accomplish this end, Congress passed the Indian Trade
and Intercourse Acts in an attempt to enforce its Indian treaties
and stop non-Indian encroachments upon tribal lands.38 These
acts included a number of fundamental elements. They forbade
the transfer of Indian lands to individuals or states except by
treaty under the authority of the United States.39 The statutes
restricted non-Indians from entering Indian Country without
permission from the United States government. 40 The Acts
controlled trade with the Indians, 41 including controlling all
liquor traffic into Indian county.42  They provided for the
punishment of crimes committed by members of one race
against another. 43 Finally, the Act embraced a philosophy of
promoting "civilization" and "education" of Indians, in the hope
34. Id. at Art. VII.
35. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 87.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Trade and Intercourse Acts are various statutes that were passed over the
course of a number of years. The first was passed into law as Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. This act was only temporary Act. It
was expanded, refined in later statutes. These statutes are: Trade and Intercourse Act of
March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329, Trade and Intercourse Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1
Stat. 469, and Trade and Intercourse Act of March 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743. The
Trade and Intercourse Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13 2 Stat. 139 was the official Trade
and Intercourse Act. It was mainly a restatement of the past laws, but it was no longer
temporary. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 90-91.
39. 1 Stat. 329 §8 (1793), 1 Stat. 469 §§8, 12 (1796), 1 Stat. 743 §§5, 12 (1799), 2
Stat. 139 §12 (1802).
40. 1 Stat. 469 §§2, 3 (1796), 1 Stat. 743 §§2, 3 (1799), 2 Stat. 139 §3 (1802).
41. 1 Stat. 137 §§1, 4 (1790), 1 Stat. 329 §§1, 6 (1793), 1 Stat. 469 §§7, 8, 9, 10
(1796), 1 Stat. 743 §§7, 8, 10 (1799), 2 Stat. 139 §§7, 8 10, 11, 21 (1802).
42. 2 Stat. 139 §21 (1802).
43. 1 Stat. 137 §5 (1790), 1 Stat. 329 §5 (1793), 1 Stat. 469 §§5, 6 (1796), 1 Stat.
743 §§4, 6 (1799), 2 Stat. 139 §4 (1802).
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that they would be absorbed into the existing American public. 44
Besides treaties and federal Indian statutes, the federal
court system was the other major player that shaped Indian
policy in the formative years. The federal court began its major
involvement shortly after the last of the Trade and Intercourse
Acts was passed. Three major Indian cases were decided during
the Formative years. 45 Chief Justice Marshall presided over all
three. These cases have come to be known as the Marshall
Indian Trilogy.
In Johnson v. McIntosh,46 the tribal chiefs had granted land
to private individuals before the Revolution.47 The issue before
the Court concerned whether the tribes had the power to
transfer land, or if this power was solely in the hands of the
federal government.48  To decide this complicated issue,
Marshall relied upon the European Doctrine of Discovery. 49
This international law doctrine provides that the British
Crown's discovery of lands in a new world gave it the sole right
to purchase land from the native tribes.50 By ousting the
British, the United States became the sole preemptive right
holder of Indian lands.5 1 Although the tribes held a right of
occupancy, they lost the right to freely alienate the land.52 They
could convey their land to no one but the United States.53
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia54 was the second decision in the
Marshall trilogy. Gold was discovered within the Cherokee's
lands in Georgia.55 Georgia increased its demands to remove the
Cherokees west of the Mississippi. 56 However, the Cherokee
were not easily moved from their lands. They had an
established society, as opposed to a nomadic society. They relied
44. 1 Stat. 137 §§1, 4 (1790), 1 Stat. 329 §§1, 6 (1793), 1 Stat. 469 §§7, 8, 9, 10
(1796), 1 Stat. 743 §§7-8, 10 (1799), 2 Stat. 139 §§7-8, 10-11, 21 (1802).
45. See generally Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1932).
46. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
47. Id. at 572-73.
48. Id. at 572.
49. Id. at 573.
50. Id. at 573, 584.
51. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 587.
52. Id. at 592.
53. Id. at 592-93.
54. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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on their agricultural lands.57 They had their own written
language and a strong government.58 In fact, at the time of this
case, the tribes literacy rate was 90%.59 In 1827, Georgia passed
laws attempted to abolish Cherokee government and annex the
tribe's lands to Georgia.60 The Cherokees sued Georgia in an
original proceeding in the United States Supreme Court.61
The United States Supreme Court split in a 2-2-2 decision
on whether they could hear the case.6 2 The issue was whether
the Cherokee Nation had standing to sue as a foreign state.6 3
Justices Thompson and Story stated they believed the Cherokee
Nation was a foreign nation, therefore the court had original
jurisdiction under the Constitution.64 Justices Johnson and
Baldwin argued that the tribe was not a nation at all, but a
collection of conquered people. 65 Thus, they had no sovereignty.
Justices Marshall and McLean, who wrote the majority
opinion, 66 sided with Justices Johnson and Baldwin.67 Marshall
held the tribes were sovereign nations, but they were also
domestic, dependent nations.68 The tribes were, in effect, wards
of the United States.69 Because of this duty of protection, the
tribes could not be sovereign nations. Therefore, the Cherokees
were not a "foreign nation" within the meaning of Article III and
did not have standing to sue as a foreign state. This protection
that the court discussed was a very limited protection. The
tribes were only protected from the state government, not the
federal government.70
In 1830, Congress enacted The Removal Act of 1830. 71 This
57. DELORES J. HUFF, To LIVE HEROICALLY: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND
AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION, XV (1997).
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. The tribes were literate in both English and Cherokee.
60. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 7-8.
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 69.
65. Id. at 22, 34.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 17.
69. Id. at 17-18.
70. Cf Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
71. Removal Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411; see also GETCHES, supra
note 1, at 98. As a result of the Removal Act, Georgia was awarded the land that they
had sought in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
346 Vol. 62
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act was signed into law by Andrew Jackson in 1830.72 President
Jackson was the primary force behind the Removal Act.73 He
had personally supported Georgia's claim of sovereignty over
Cherokee lands.74 He realized, after Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
that the only way to avoid a federal and state battle was to
extinguish Indian land holdings in the eastern United States.75
By this time, the Louisiana Purchase had made possible the idea
of a Indian territory west of the Mississippi River. In the year of
the Louisiana Purchase, President Thomas Jefferson wrote to
William Harrison stating:
our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach the
Indians, and they will in time either incorporate with us as
citizens of the United States, or be removed beyond the
Mississippi.. .As to their fear, we presume that our strength and
their weakness is now so visible that they must see we have only
to shut our hand to crush them, and that all our liberalities to the
process form motives of pure humanity only. Should any tribe be
foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing of
the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the
Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to
other, and a furtherance of our consolidation. 76
This sentiment was to govern the Removal Act. Its purpose
was to do just as Jefferson had suggested, remove the Eastern
tribes to the West, opening their former lands to "American"
settlement. 77  The reason was simple. Americans were land
hungry.78
However, before Jackson could implement the actual
removal of the Cherokee tribe, the United States Supreme
Court heard the last case in the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v.
Georgia.79 In that case, Georgia had passed a law which
required any non-Indian resident of the Cherokee territory to
obtain a license from the Governor.80 Samuel Worcester and
72. The Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
73. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 123.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Letter from President Johnson to William Henry Harrison (February 27, 1803),
(reprinted in , DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 22, (Francis Paul
Prucha ed., 1975)).
77. The Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411-12.
78. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 148-49.
79. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
80. Id. at 521 (citing December 22, 1830 Act of Georgia Legislature § 1, 7) ("An act
to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power, by all persons, under pretext of
authority form the Cherokee Indians and their laws, and to prevent white person from
residing within that part of the chartered limits of Georgia.. .all white persons residing
2001 347
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several other missionaries were arrested for violating this law.8 1
All were granted pardons. However, Worcester and Elizur
Butler refused to accept the pardons. They wanted to challenge
the Georgia law in court.8 2
Chief Justice Marshall was faced with the question of
whether Georgia could assert its power over tribal lands.8 3
Marshall wrote for the majority stating that Georgia did not
have such power over Indian Country.8 4 Federal law had
preempted state law as it affects Indian affairs. The Cherokee
Nation's sovereign and semi-independent status was limited
only in its right to convey land.8 5 Marshall reasserted the notion
that the federal government had the duty of protection and
regulatory power over Indian affairs.8 6
At the end of his term, Jackson finally succeeded in the
removal of the Five Civilized Tribes.8 7 This removal occasioned
the famous "Trail of Tears".88 Many Cherokees, Choctaws and
Chickasaws lost their lives during their enforced march to their
"new" land.8 9 The removals and treaty breaking caused many
tribes across the nation to rebel. Battles were fought, massacres
occurred, and many Indian lives were lost.90 Finally, after years
of bloodshed, the Indians were forced to recognize that they
would never be able to win against the sheer number of
Americans and the United States' military power. The tribes
uncomfortably settled in on their reservations.
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation.. .without a licence [sic] or permit from his
excellency the governor.. .shall be guilty of high misdemeanor.")
81. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 113.
82. Id.
83. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542 (1832).
84. Id. at 561.
85. Id. at 557, 559.
86. Id. at 561.
87. GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE FIVE
CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS (1932).
88. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 92; see also FOREMAN, supra note 87.
89. PETER NABOKOV, NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CRONICLE OF INDIAN-
WHITE RELATIONS, 149-51 (1999).
90. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 62-70. These battles and
massacres include the Battle at Little Big Horn, the Sand Creek Massacre, and the
Massacre at Wounded Knee. See generally DAVID SAVLDI, SAND CREEK AND THE
RHETORIC OF EXTERMINATION: A CASE STUDY IN INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS (1989).
This is an incredible in depth study into the reasons why the Sand Creek Massacre, one
of the most horrible examples of its kind, occurred. See generally NABOKOV, supra note
89. This is a collections of the testimonies of different American Indians interspersed
with historical background from the author. It has very powerful personal accounts of
the battles and massacres.
10
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C. Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928)
The allotment policy was born of a perceived non-Indian
need for Indian land.91 If only the government could make
Indians live as white settlers, the Indians would need far less
land to survive.92 It was thought that allotment would be good
for Indian welfare as it would erase the "savagery" represented
by tribal autonomy.93
These philosophy led to the passage of the 1887 General
Allotment Act, commonly referred to as the "Dawes Act".94 The
Dawes Act did several different things. Reservation land was
surveyed, divided up and allotted to individual Indian families. 95
These Indian allotments were as follows: 160 acres to each
family head; 80 acres to each single person over 18 years of age
and to each orphan under 18; married women received no
separate rights to land.96 These allotments were held in trust by
the United States government for 25 years, after which, they
would be transferred to the allottee in fee simple.97 Allotments
were not subject to a state or local tax while held in trust.98 Any
surplus lands were opened to non-Indian settlement, with
proceeds from the sale of the these lands to be held in trust by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for the tribe.99
In 1903, the Allotment Act was challenged by the Kiowa,
Comanche and Apache tribes in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.100 The
Allotment Act created 13,000 non-Indian homesteads on these
tribes' reservations. 101 The tribes asserted that any allotment,
or other alteration of their territorial holdings, was a violation of
their treaty rights.10 2 Under the treaties, Congress' power was
limited to only the care and protection of the tribes. In cases of
91. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 128, 131-32.
92. Id. at 128-29.
93. Id. at 129.
94. The General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 349, 354, 381) (1994).
95. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 133, 135. See also GETCHES, supra note
1, at 166.
96. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 166 (citing Delos Sacket Otis, History of the
Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs
73rd Cong., 428-85 (2d Sess. 1934)).
97. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 166.
98. Id. at 174.
99. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 134-35.
100. 187 U.S. 553, 560 (1903).
101. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 182.
102. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
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emergency, the power to divide tribal land was allowed only if
the assent of the tribes could not be obtained. 1 3 The tribes
argued this allotment was not an emergency and the United
States violated its duty to protect the tribe. 10 4 Justice White of
the United State Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court held that Congress had plenary power over the
tribes. 10 5 Congress may abrogate the provisions of an Indian
treaty when circumstances arise that justify such abrogation. 06
Justice White presumed that Congress would only abrogate
treaties in good faith, and because of this presumption refused
to review whether Congress did in fact act in good faith.0 7
President Theodore Roosevelt described the allotment
process as "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass." 08 A member of the Oklahoma Creek tribe fumed, "Egypt
had it locusts, Asiatic countries their cholera, France had its
Jacobins, England its black plague, Memphis had the yellow
fever .... but it was left for the unfortunate Indian Territory to
be afflicted with the worst scourge of the nineteenth century, the
Dawes Commission."0 9 Upon implementation of the Dawes Act,
the tribes lost 85% of their land."0 This loss of land base
fragmented the Indian community."' Farming efforts ultimately
failed because most of the allotted land was unsuitable for
farming." 2 In addition, Indian families were unable to cultivate
the land due to a lack of tools suitable for farming. 113 They also
lacked the knowledge necessary to become successful at
farming. 114 When much of the land became subject to state and
local taxation, many Indian families could not afford to pay the
103. Id.
104. Id.




108. 35 CONG. REC. 90 (1906).
109. NABOKOV, supra note 89, at 256.
110. The Purposes and Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Rights Bill, Hearing on
H.R. 7902 Before the Senate and House Comms. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 16 (1934)
(memorandum of John Collier).
111. Id. at 17.
112. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 169-70, (citing Delos Sacket Otis, History of the
Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong. 428-85 (1934)).
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taxes. 115 Their lands were ultimately sold at auction. If the
Indian family was able to hold onto its land, at death the land
passed intestate to the heirs of the deceased. 116 Within three
generations, the land had been divided into so many small plots,
the allotted land could not be practically used. 117 Ultimately,
around 90 million acres of allotted Indian lands were sold to
non-Indians. 118
D. Reorganization (1928-1942)
The late 1920's and early 1930's marked a massive policy
change. In 1928, the Meriam Report was released." 9 This non-
governmental two-year study of the Indian Bureau documented
the failures of the Indian Allotment policy. 120 This report
stimulated a re-examination of the Nation's Indian policy.12'
This change was characterized by a move for tolerance, and
sometimes respect, for the traditional aspects of Indian
culture. 122 This move culminated in the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (hereinafter, "IRA"). 123
The purpose of the IRA was to encourage "economic
development, self-determination, cultural plurality and the
revival of tribalism." 24 It also ended the allotment policy of the
federal government. 125 Thereafter, existing Indian allotments
were to be held in federal trust indefinitely. 126 The so-called
surplus Indian lands that had not been sold were to be given
back to the tribes. 27 The IRA also established a tribal loan
program which would allow the tribes to set up trade and
115. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 12 (1995) (citing
JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934 89
(1991)).
116. NABOKOV, supra note 89, at 259.
117. Id.; GETCHES, supra note 1, at 174.
118. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 152.
119. LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR GOVr RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Reprint Johnson Reprint Co. 1971) (1928).
120. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 144.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 145.
123. Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479) (1994).
124. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 147.
125. 48 Stat. 984 §1 (1934).
126. 48 Stat. 984 §2 (1934).
127. 48 Stat. 984 §§10-11 (1934).
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vocational schools. 128  In addition, the IRA sponsored a
constitutional and representative system of tribal
government. 129 This would allow the tribes to adopt tribal
constitutions, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior.130 By allowing the Indians to take a hand in self-
government, it was thought that Indians would adapt to modern
society. 13' The IRA did not apply to those tribes where a
majority of the adults voted against adopting the provisions of
the Act. Those tribes which failed to vote on the Act became
subject to the IRA by default.
E. Termination (1945-1961)
The Indian Reorganization Act was criticized by many. 32
For years Congress fought the Act and ultimately all but
destroyed it.' 33 In 1953, Congress adopted a resolution to
"terminate" Indian tribes and sever the Indian status as a
special ward of the government.' 34 The BIA was instructed to
begin a survey to determine which tribes were suitable for
termination. 135 This period is noted as "the most concerted drive
against Indian property and Indian survival since the removals
following the acts of 1830 and the liquidation of tribes and
reservations following 1887."136
As a result, a small number of tribes were completely
terminated. 37 This meant that these tribes no longer received
128. 48 Stat. 984 §16 (1934).
129. 48 Stat. 984 §16 (1934).
130. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 149.
131. Id. at 147.
132. Id. at 149.
133. See generally id. at 152-59.
134. Freedom From Supervision, H. R. Cong. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953).
135. The test used was the Zimmerman Test. The criteria for termination were: (1)
the degree of culture; (2) the evidence of businessability; (3) literacy level; and (4) the
Indians ability to accept non-Indian ways. It is interesting to note that the head of the
BIA during most of the termination time was Dillon S. Myer, former director of the
Japanese-American detention camp program. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 157-
58.
136. ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES, 349
(1970).
137. Only 3% of all recognized Indian people were effected, yet 109 tribes were
terminated and over 1 million acres of land were transferred out of tribal status.
GETCHES, supra note 1, at 209 (citing Charles F. Wilkerson & Eric R. Biggs, The
Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151-4 (1977)). Three of
the largest terminations occurred to the Klamath and Menominee and the Mixed Blood
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any money for federal social programs. 138 The tribes' lands were
sold off and the proceeds held in trust for the tribe. States were
then given authority over these terminated tribes. 3 9 "[Tihe
state legislatures and county boards had broad authority over
basic matters like education, adoptions, alcoholism, land use
and other fundamental areas of social and economic concern." 40
Those tribes not terminated found themselves subject to new
federal laws that led to the loss of much Indian land,'4 ' the
closing of federally-funded schools a2 and a loss of federally-
funded hospitals. 143
The most important of these new laws was Public Law
280.'4 Public Law 280 extended state civil and criminal
jurisdiction into Indian Country in five states. 145 It granted
jurisdiction "over offenses committed by or against Indians in
the areas of Indian Country." 46 All other states could assume
the same type of jurisdiction by statute or state constitutional
amendment. 47 Montana adopted Public Law 280.148
Public Law 280 provides: "Nothing in the section.. .shall
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band or community of
any right, privilege or immunity afforded under federal treaty,
agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or
fishing or the control of licensing, or regulation thereof."149 This
portion of Public Law 280 seemed to conflict with the
138. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 175.
139. Id. Before termination, only the federal government and federally recognized
tribal counsels could pass law over the reservations. Worcester v. Georgia 3 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).
140. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 210-11 (citing Delos Sacket Otis, History of the
Allotment Policy, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs
73d Cong. 428-85 (1934)).
141. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 168-69.
142. Id. at 177 (referencing [1952] SEC. INT. ANN. REP. 400).
143. S. REP. NO. 2664, 84th Cong. 3. (reprinted in 1956).
144. Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§1162) (1994).
145. Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588, §§1-7 (1953). The states were California,
Nebraska, Minnesota (except for Red Lake Reservation), Oregon and Wisconsin (except
for Menominee Reservation) . Alaska was added to the list in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) (1994).
146. Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
147. The states that adopted PL 280 are Arizona, Florida, Montana, Idaho, Nevada,
North Dakota, Utah, Washington and Iowa.
148. Montana adopted a portion of PL 280 at MONT. CODE ANN § 2-1-301 et seq
(2001).
149. Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
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Termination Act of 1954150 which took away hunting and fishing
rights.151
This issue was resolved in Menominee v. United States. 152 In
that case, the Menominee tribe sued the United States for
recognition of their hunting and fishing rights under the Wolf
River Treaty of 1854.153 This treaty granted the Menominee
tribe special hunting and fishing rights on their land. 154 The
tribe argued the termination of their tribe did not extinguish
their treaty rights.155 The Supreme Court agreed. In coming to
this decision, the Court analyzed both Public Law 280 and the
Termination Act of 1954 and determined that unless Congress
explicitly states in the termination legislation that these right
are abrogated, the tribe retains its treaty rights unless Congress
specifically states otherwise. 156 Thus, the Menominee tribe
retained their hunting and fishing rights.157
The tribes recognized that termination was destroying
tribalism.158 The only way to stop this destruction was for the
tribes to effectively influence federal Indian policy.159 The
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), a "supratribal"
entity, was organized in the mid-1940's with this in mind. 160 In
1954, during the congressional hearing on the termination issue,
the NCAI declared an emergency meeting to protest
termination. 161
Although this protest ultimately failed, "[tihe result was
like a shot in the supratribal arm."162 The tribes rallied together
150. This was actually a series of Acts passed by Congress terminating a number of
tribes. Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch 1207, 68 Stat. 1099 (repealed 1980) (formerly codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 741-760); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§721-728); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 733, 68 Stat. 724 (repealed 1977 with respect to
Siletz Tribe) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§691-708); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68
Stat. 718 (repealed with respect to the Modoc Tribe) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§564-564x); Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (formerly
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§891-902 (1970)); Act of Aug. 27, 1954, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§677-677aa).
151. 391 U.S. 404(1968).
152. Id. at 405.
153. Id. at 405-06.
154. Id. at 406.
155. Id. at 410.
156. Id. at 410-13.
157. Id. at 413.
158. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 224.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 225.
161. Id. at 225.
162. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INIDIAN
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in a concerted effort to stop termination. Five hundred Indians
from seventy tribes met at the American Indian Chicago
Conference.163 At the conclusion of the conference they "rejected
termination and asserted the right of Indian communities to
choose their own ways of life."16 It was the largest gathering of
different Indian communities in decades. Its voice became a
beacon of change. After a long and slow struggle, the opposition
to termination finally won.
F. Self-Determination (1961-Present)
After the era of termination ended, the federal government
returned to the policies that surrounded the Indian
Reorganization Act. 165 One major show of federal support for
tribal self-determination was the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968.166 This legislation imposed most of the requirements of
the Bill of Rights on the reservations. 167 It also amended Public
Law 280.168 This amendment stated that states could no longer
assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over tribes unless the tribes
consented to an assertion of jurisdiction. 169 This halted the
extension of Public Law 280, but did not apply retroactively. 170
In 1970, President Nixon issued a landmark address calling
for a new federal policy of "self-determination" for the Indian
tribes.' 71 He noted that termination was "morally and legally
unacceptable, because.. .the mere threat of termination tends to
discourage greater self-sufficiency." 172 President Nixon stressed
the importance of the trust relationship between the federal
government and the Indian Nations.173 He urged Congress to
adopt a program to permit the tribes to manage their affairs




166. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1341) (1968).
167. Indian Civil Rights Act, Title 1. This includes the language of the equal
protection and due process clauses, but excludes the establishment clause and right to a
grand jury indictment or counsel.
168. Indian Civil Rights Act, Title IV.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
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with autonomy. 174 This included control over Indian schools and
economic development. 175
President Nixon's speech jumpstarted Congress into passing
a number of laws aimed at promoting Indian self-determination.
This legislation seemed to follow the suggestions in Nixon's
message very closely. 176 First Congress passed the Indian
Education Act of 1972 and other similar education reforms.
These Acts addressed the need for Indian control over their
schools.' 77  These series of laws provided for grants to
educational programs that were created to meet the special
needs of Indian children.'78 Broad discretion was given to the
Commissioner of Education to award these grants.179
Next, Congress passed that Indian Financing Act of 1974.180
This legislation required the federal government "to provide
capital on a reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize
Indian resources, both physical and human, to appoint where
the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization
and management of their own resources and where they will
enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts
comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring
communities."'81
In addition, the Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975182 gave express authority to the
Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services to
contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and other Indian
organizations for the delivery of federal services. 8 3
A majority of the legislation reflected a major internal policy
change within the federal government. Although the tribes were
funded by the federal government, they were to retain control
over the detail of program decisions and money expenditures.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See generally Daniel H. Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its
Impact on Reservation Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617, 624-29 (1976).
177. Pub. L. No. 92-318 §§ 401-453, 86 Stat. 235, 344-45 (1972), (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 241aa-241ff, 1211a, 1221f-1221h, 3385-3385b) (1994).
178. Indian Education Act, 86 Stat. at 335 (codified at 20 U.S.C. at §241aa).
179. Indian Education Act, 86 Stat. at 339 (codified at 20 U.S.C. at §3385).
180. Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453, 1462-1469,
1481-1498, 1511-1512, 1521-1524, 1541-1543) (1974)).
181. Indian Financing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1994).
182. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 503-12, 521-22, 523-35, 595 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
183. See generally Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No.
93-380, 88 Stat. 484, 503-12, 521-22, 523-35, 595 (1974).
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However, this change did not extend into practical matters.
While Congress expounded how tribes would be given self-
determination to implement programs and spend monies in
order to become self sufficient, the BIA did not implement any
programs to assist with the change.1 4 The BIA failed to assist
the tribes in setting up revenue codes.' 8 5 Not once did the BIA
help the tribes set up any sort of tax system, which could have
included many different programs that would produce revenue
for the tribes. 8 6 "In fact, the BIA did not, and does not now,
view tribal governments as bonafide governments but rather as
a type of local extension of federal government (very similar to a
Soil Conservation District)."8 7
BIA's failure to implement programs to carry out the
previous legislation did not stop Congress from enacting
additional legislation. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978188
may be one of the most important and meaningful pieces of
legislation addressing Indian tribes' human rights concerns.
This act created a comprehensive adjudication process for child
custody cases which defers heavily to the tribal governments. 8 9
There has been a distinct lack of major Indian legislation
since the 1970's. Much legislation has been adopted, but most of
the legislation merely adds to or amends the 1970's
legislation. 190 This means that the Supreme Court has been free
to interpret the policies and intent of the 1970's legislation for
almost 30 years. As we shall see, the Court's decisions in the
last twenty years have encroached upon the tribe's ownership of
land, the ability of the tribes to govern, and most recently,
decimated important economic bases for tribal programs. It is
no longer a time of "self-determination."
III. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION HISTORY
The decision in Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf' 91
is not an anomaly of the court system. It is the product of




188. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
189. It could be said that because this Act was so comprehensive, and the assistance
to the tribes was built into the Act, it had a chance of succeeding, unlike the different
economic and education legislation.
190. GETCHES, supra note 1, at 230-33.
191. 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1997).
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twenty years of steady, unchecked encroachment by the courts
upon tribal sovereignty. To truly comprehend the impact of Red
Wolf, it is important to understand the United States Supreme
Court's major tribal civil jurisdiction decisions. It is also
important to take a closer look at the various cases in order to
piece together the reality that few have observed, but becomes
evident when looked at as a whole-this may no longer be a time
of self-determination for Indian tribes.
A. Montana v. United States: The First Step Upon the Path of
Encroaching Tribal Civil Jurisdiction.
In Montana v. United States,192 the Crow tribe sought a
declaratory judgment to retain regulatory authority over
hunting and fishing within the reservation boundaries. 193 The
parcel of land in contention was the Big Horn River's bed and
banks, which lay within the Crow Reservation's boundaries.
The Crow tribe had passed a resolution prohibiting hunting and
fishing within the reservation boundaries by anyone who was
not a member of the tribe.194 However, the State of Montana
contended it had the authority to regulate hunting and fishing
within the reservation 195 and continued to issue licenses to hunt
and fish on the Crow Reservation. 96 This led to a confrontation.
The Crow tribe argued that it had authority to regulate
hunting and fishing based on the following factors. First, the
land was within the Crow reservation boundaries. 97 Logically,
the tribe had the right to regulate hunting and fishing within
the borders of its reservation, just as a state has the authority
within its borders. Second, the tribe argued that according to
the treaties of 1851198 and 1868,199 the tribe retained the ability
to regulate use of the reservation. 200 The treaty of 1851 stated
that the tribes did not "surrender the privilege of hunting,
192. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
193. Id. at 550.
194. Resolution No. 74-05 (1974). This proscription covered land held in fee simple
by non-tribal members. Montana, 450 U.S. at 547. According to the court, this was
roughly twenty eight (28) percent of the reservation. Id. at 548.
195. Montana, 450 U.S. at 548.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 550.
198. First Treaty of Fort Laramine of 1851, 11 Stat. 743.
199. Second Treaty of Fort Laramine of 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
200. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
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fishing, or passing over," any of the lands in dispute. 20 1 The
treaty of 1868 was more specific. The United States agreed the
reservation "shall be set apart for the absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation" of the Crow tribe, and that no non-Indians
except agents of the Government "shall ever be permitted to
pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation. 20 2
Disregarding the treaty, the Supreme Court held the Crow
tribe did not own the banks and beds of the river..203 Instead of
interpreting the treaties by the accepted doctrine of deference to
the understanding of the tribe at the time of signing the
treaty, 20 4 the Court held the treaty should by interpreted by
English common law.20 5
Based upon navigable waters law at the time of the treaty,
the bank and beds were held in trust by the United States
federal government for the future state of Montana.20 6 This
right to navigable waters supersedes the right of tribal
sovereignty, unless the tribe specifically retained the property
rights to the Big Horn River. 20 7 The Court found that neither of
the Treaties of Fort Laramie had language in it that was strong
enough to overcome this presumption. 20 8 Because Montana was
now a state, the land the United States held in trust transferred
to Montana which then held the land in fee simple. 209
As a basis for the Montana Rule, the Court relied upon
Oliphant v. Squamish Tribe,210 which held that tribal courts
lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation
boundaries. 211 The Court stated that "the principles upon which
201. Id. (citing First Treaty of Fort Larmine of 1851, 11 Stat. 743).
202. Montana, 405 U.S. at 548 (citing Second Treaty of Fort Larmine of 1868, 15
Stat. 649).
203. Montana, 450 U.S. at 549.
204. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (in construing
Indian treaties, courts should "look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty"). United States v. Shoshone Tribes, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938), that ambiguous
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians. (E.g. McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973), Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)).
205. Montana, 450 U.S. at 554. This is the beginning of a line of cases, in which the
provisions of the treaty are disregarded in favor of English common law.
206. Id. (relying on United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
207. Montana, 450 U.S. at 554.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 556-57.
210. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
211. Oliphant v. Squamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). By relying on Oliphant,
the court rejected previous language stating "Indian tribes possess a broad measure of
civil jurisdiction over activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands over which
the tribes have a significant interest." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
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[the Oliphant decision] relied support the general proposition
that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of a nonmember of the tribe."212 The
Supreme Court held that the Crow tribe did not have the
authority to regulate hunting and fishing activities of non-
Indians on reservation land, when the land is owned in fee
simple by a nonmember of the tribe.213 The Montana Rule
effectively reduced tribal sovereignty within the reservation's
boundaries. Instead of regulating all activity within reservation
boundaries, tribes are limited to regulating only land held in
trust for the tribes, or land held in fee simple by a tribal
member. The Montana Rule states that unless Congress gives
express permission, Indian tribes do not have civil jurisdiction
over a nonmember for disputes arising on non-Indian land
within the reservation. 21 4
Although the Court established the Montana Rule, it
additionally established two exceptions. First, if the
nonmember has entered into a consensual relationship with the
tribe, such as a contractual or business agreement, the tribe has
jurisdiction over the nonmember. 215  Second, if the activity
affects the tribes' "political integrity, economic security, health
or welfare," the tribe retains jurisdiction over the nonmember.21 6
Applying the first exception to the case, the court found no
consensual relationship between the tribe and Montana. 217 In
analyzing the second exception, the Court was unable to fathom
the effect of non-tribal hunting and fishing along the Big Horn
River within the reservation boundaries, especially since the
tribe mainly relied on buffalo meat to survive, not fish.2' 8
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980).
212. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. It has been suggested that the courts use of
"member" instead of the word "citizen" is very meaningful. Member refers to an
association or society while citizen refers to a political entity. This means that the courts
are treating Indian nations as a social organization, instead of as a political government.
The laws are very different for an organization when compared to a government. Allison
M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U.PITT. L. REV. 93 (1996).
213. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
214. Id. at 565.
215. Id. at 565-66.
216. Id. at 566.
217. Id. at 567. The Court did not explain this decision. Instead, the court assumed
there was no consensual relationship.
218. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556. The Court found the diet of the Crow tribe as
relevant to the English Common Law foundation of property rights. However, see
Justice Blackmun's dissent which states that the majority's conclusion that the mainstay
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A major effect of Montana is a substantial limitation on
tribal sovereignty. Prior to this case, regulatory authority was
geographically based. This meant that the tribes had authority
to regulate land located within the boundaries of the
reservation.219  The Montana Rule changed this. Now,
sovereignty in a regulatory scheme is based upon a mixture of
membership and geography.220 The land has to be owned by a
member of the tribe for the tribe to have regulatory authority
over the land.221 This rule "limiting tribal authority to tribal
members renders the tribe unable to exercise control over
individuals, including members of the reservation community,
whose actions on the reservation may have a profound effect on
the tribe and its members." 222 This vastly changed the shape of
tribal regulatory authority, and affects future tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members.
B. National Farmers Union Insurance Company v.Crow Tribe
of Indians: The Supreme Court's Next Step in Eradicating Tribal
Jurisdiction Under the Guise of Giving Great Deference to Tribes
Four years after Montana,223 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to National Farmers Union Insurance
Company v. Crow Tribe of Indians.224 The plaintiff was the
guardian of a Crow child who was injured by a person driving a
motorcycle. 225 The accident occurred in the school parking lot
which was within the boundaries of the Crow reservation. 226
However, the school grounds were owned by the state of
of tribal diet is buffalo is open to serious question. Id. The Court revisited the Montana
Rule in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989). In this case, the Court drastically limited the second exception to the
Montana rule by stating the "impact must be demonstrably serious and must imperil the
political integrity, the economic security or the health and welfare of the tribe." Id. at
431 (emphasis added).
219. Dussias, supra note 212, at 86. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribe of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980).
220. Dussias, supra note 212, at 86.
221. Id. at 96, sets out the basis of an analogy for this situation. For example, if a
California man wanted to hunt or fish in Montana, there would be no question that
within the boundaries of Montana, the state would have the right to regulate the
California man's activities. The question she posits is very simple. Why is there a
difference? The author finds that the reason rests in the "bigotry" of the Court.
222. Id. at 86.
223. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
224. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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Montana.227 The guardian filed suit against the School District
in Crow Tribal Court for the medical bills and pain and suffering
allegedly caused by the injuries.228 Consequently, the school
district's insurer, National Farmers Union, was joined as a
defendant, although it was not originally named in the
complaint. 229 The school district failed to reply to the complaint.
Therefore, the Crow tribal court issued a default judgment in
favor of the child for all damages alleged.230
Instead of appealing to the Crow Court of Appeals, National
Farmers Union filed for a temporary restraining order in the
federal district court for the State of Montana claiming the
tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.231 It claimed the
question of jurisdiction arose from a treaty, and was therefore a
federal question based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.232 This law grants
the federal court "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States."233
National Farmers Union argued that jurisdiction to hear the
case lay with the federal district court of Montana. 234 The
district court agreed. It granted a temporary restraining order
against the tribe's enforcement of the judgment and
subsequently granted a permanent injunction. 235 The plaintiff
appealed the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant
the injunction. 236 The court held the district court could not
support its holding on any constitutional, statutory or common-
law ground. 237 Additionally, the dissent stated that the district
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 847.
230. Id. at 847-48.
231. Id. at 848.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 848.
235. Id. at 849.
236. Id.
237. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1322-23 (9th 1984). The majority first held that the tribe was not bound by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, National Farmers equal protection and due process
claim failed. However, the court concluded that the tribe is bound by the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §1301. This does require the tribes to act in a manner consistent
with due process and equal protection. However, when Congress created this Act, they
intended to specifically restrict federal court interference with tribal court proceeding to
a review on petition for habeas corpus. Because this was a civil suit, not a writ of habeas
362 Vol. 62
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court would not have jurisdiction until all remedies at the tribal
court were exhausted. 238 This decision was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit. The majority found that the district court had the right
to determine if the tribal court was exceeding the lawful limits
of its jurisdiction.239 However, the Court adopted the rationale
of the dissent from the Ninth Circuit and held that the district
court must wait until all available remedies were exhausted in
the tribal court system before review. 240 This is now known as
the "Tribal Exhaustion Rule."
The Court stated that the policy of tribal exhaustion was
based on Congress' commitment "to a policy of supporting tribal
self-government and self-determination." 241 The Court found the
tribal court should have the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases for the challenge.242 Also, the tribal
courts should develop a full record to aid the federal court in
making its own determination.2 43 The Court created one
exception to this exhaustion rule. If the determination of
jurisdiction is motivated by harassment or is conducted in bad
faith, then exhaustion is not required. 2"
The most important result of the Court's decision was not
the establishment of the Exhaustion Rule, but the granting to
federal district courts the right to review tribal court jurisdiction
in civil matters. This is the first time the right of civil
jurisdictional review based on a federal question has been
granted. The result is that the tribe can fully adjudicate a case
corpus, the court held it did not have the authority to hear the issues applying under the
Indian Civil Rights Act. The court held it could hear an issue applying under federal
common law for the same reason.
238. Id. at 1324-26. The dissent (in part), written by J. Wright, forwarded a tribal
exhaustion rule for three different reasons. First, meaningful tribal remedies exist. The
Tribal Code allows plaintiffs to challenge jurisdiction by appeal. Second, J. Wright felt
the tribal system would be strengthened by an exhaustion requirement. This would stop
Plaintiffs from by-passing the tribal court system. "Such disrespect for tribal
institutions should be discouraged." Id. at 1326. Last, there is no immediate need for the
Federal Courts to step into such a case. In the interest of respect and upholding the
authority of the tribe, plaintiffs should be forced to exhaust all the remedies available to
them in the tribal courts. Id.
239. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
240. Id. at 857.
241. Id. at 856.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 857 n.21.
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in which a treaty is at issue, but the district court is not legally
required to give any deference to the tribal court's holdings of
law and finding of fact when it reviews the case. 245
C. Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v.LaPlante: The Court
Develops Another Way for Non-Indians to Move Jurisdiction Into
Federal Court
Two years after National Farmers, the Court heard a
similar case, Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante.246
The plaintiff, a member of the Blackfeet tribe, was employed by
Wellman ranch, located on the Blackfeet reservation. 247 While
driving a company truck on reservation lands, he was injured.
He subsequently filed suit in Blackfeet tribal court.248 The tribal
court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
case.
249
Iowa Mutual Insurance Company filed suit in federal
district court to remove the case to the district court claiming
that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction based on diversity
jurisdiction, as opposed to a federal question.250 The district
court held that Iowa Mutual did not have a right to exercise
diversity jurisdiction. 251 The Blackfeet tribe must be given a
chance to determine its own jurisdiction. In dicta, the court
stated that based on similar cases, the Blackfeet tribe had
exclusive jurisdiction in this case.252 "[Ginly if the Blackfeet
Tribe decides not to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction. . .would
this court be free to entertain" the case under diversity
jurisdiction. 25 3 In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. 254 The court relied on the
245. Big Horn Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 2000) (The
standard of review for an Indian tribal court decision deciding jurisdictional issues is de
novo on questions of federal law and clearly erroneous for factual questions. Questions
about tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is an issue of federal law reviewed de novo.)
246. 480 U.S. 9 (1986).
247. Id. at 11.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 12. It is interesting to note that although Blackfeet Tribal Code allows
for an appeal of a jurisdictional ruling, it only allows such a review after a decision on
the merits. Blackfeet Tribal Code, Ch 11, §1 (1986).
250. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 12-13.
251. Id. at 13.
252. Id. The district court relied on Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535,
538 (1949) to reach this conclusion.
253. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 13 (quoting the district court.)
254. Iowa Mutual, 774 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
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holding in National Farmers, deducing that the policy was to
extend self-governance regardless of why the case may not fall
within the tribes jurisdiction.2 5 Because the defendant had
failed to appeal in the tribal court system, there was no
exhaustion of the tribal remedies. 256
The United States Supreme Court agreed and held that
diversity, as well as federal questions, fall within the Tribal
Exhaustion Rule. 25 7 Therefore, the district court must put any
litigation brought to them on hold until the tribal court
determines its own jurisdiction, after which the District Court
has a right to review tribal jurisdiction. 258
The decision in Iowa Mutual expands the federal
encroachment into tribal court jurisdiction by adding diversity
jurisdiction as a grounds for federal review, as well as the
federal question basis for review established in National
Farmers. Now the District Court has de novo review over all
diversity and federal question cases.
D. Strate v. A-1 Contractors: Significant Broadening of the
Montana Rule
The next case of significance is Strate v. A-l Contractors.25 9
In this case, a small car driven by the plaintiff, Gisela Fredricks,
collided with a gravel truck driven by an A-1 employee. 260 The
collision occurred within the Fort Berthold Reservation on a
North Dakota state highway.261 The highway was maintained
by the State of North Dakota.262 Fredricks filed suit in tribal
court for the alleged personal injuries, medical expenses and
pain and suffering caused by the collision.263 She was not an
enrolled member of the tribe although her husband and children
were. 264  A-1 had a contractual relationship with a tribal
member who owned a construction company at the time of the
collision.265  The tribal court held that it had personal
255. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 13-14.
256. Id. at 13.
257. Id. at 17.
258. Id.
259. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
260. Id. at 442-43.
261. Id. at 442.
262. Id. at 442-43.
263. Id. 443-44.
264. Id. at 443.
265. Id.
27
Griffith: Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Red Wolf
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2001
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction since Fredricks was a resident of the reservation
and A-1 had a consensual relationship with the tribe. 266 A-1
appealed the jurisdictional ruling to the Northern Plains
Intertribal Court of Appeals. The Tribal Court of Appeals
affirmed jurisdiction. 267
Thereafter, A-1 filed a motion in federal district court for
declaratory and injunctive relief from the exercise of tribal court
jurisdiction. 268 The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the
motions since A-1 had satisfied the tribal exhaustion rule by
exhausting all remedies in tribal court.269 The district court
then held that the tribal court had been correct in its
determination of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.270
Initially, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and
distinguished the district court's ruling from Montana.271 The
court stated that Montana was meant to apply to limiting tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians for regulatory purposes only on fee
lands. 272 Because this was not a regulatory case, Montana was
not applicable. 273 The dissent disagreed, stating that Montana
was applicable. The dissent emphasized the requirement that
an overriding tribal interest must be asserted before the tribal
court could establish jurisdiction over non-Indians, on fee land,
within the boundaries of the reservation. 274
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals then granted a
rehearing en banc. This time, the court held that the Montana
Rule was the controlling law in a tribal civil jurisdiction case
involving non-Indian defendants. 275 For the tribal court to
exercise jurisdiction, one of the two exceptions to the Montana
Rule had to apply to both A-1 and Fredricks. 276 The court found
that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over Fredricks because she was
a nonmember, and there was no overriding tribal interest
because the car accident did not affect the tribe to a significant
266. Id. at 444.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 444.
270. Id.
271. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, No. 92-3359, 1994 WL 666051, slip op. at 2 (8th Cir.
Nov. 29, 1994).
272. Id. at 3
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id. at 6. (Hanson, J. dissenting)
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degree. 277
The dissent attacked the narrow reading of the second
exception of the Montana Rule by saying the threat posed by
non-Indians "who happen to wreak havoc on tribal land" should
be within the power of the tribe to adjudicate because it is one of
the "most basic and indispensable manifestations of sovereign
power."
27 8
On April 28, 1997, the United States Supreme Court sided
with the Eighth Circuit's majority and found that Montana v.
United States279 should be considered "the pathmarking case
concerning civil authority over nonmembers."280 Although in the
past, the Montana Rule was applied to regulatory authority, the
Court felt that its language should be broadly interpreted to
include all forms of "civil jurisdiction over non-Indians."28 '
The Court's first step in applying the Montana Rule was to
determine the legal status of the highway easement.2 2 The
Court found that just compensation had been paid for the
easement pursuant to legislation 2 3 empowering Congress to
grant right-of-ways through tribal land.28 4 In addition, the
Court stated that because the tribes had not specifically
reserved an interest in the easement, the tribes lost all
landowners' rights to the easement. 28 5 Because the tribe did not
277. Id. at 940.
278. Id. at 944. (Gibson, J. dissenting)
279. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
280. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
281. Id. at 453 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
282. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The rule states that a Tribe may exercise some civil
jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land if certain activities occur. For the rule to be
satisfied the land must be non-Indian fee land.
283. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454; See also, Act of February 5, 1948, ch. 45, 62 Stat. 17, 25
U.S.C. §§323-328 (1948).
284. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55.
285. Id. It is unclear when the Court believed the tribe should have specifically
retained an interest in the easement. At the time treaties were being signed, the tribes
had no education in law. There was no way for them to know that to retain rights over
land, you must reserve that right. It would have been impossible for the tribes to have
made a reservation at that time. However, this easement was bought in 1970. The
Court may have intended that the tribe should have retained an interest in the land at
this time. The tribe argued that they had done just that in the granting instrument.
The granting instrument stated:
The right reserved to the Indian land owners, their lessees, successors, and
assigns to construct crossings of the right-of-way at all points reasonably
necessary to the undisturbed use and occupan[cy] of the premises affected by
the right-of-way; such crossing to be constructed and maintained by the owners
or lawful occupants and users of said lands at their own risk and said
occupants and users to assume full responsibility for avoiding, or repairing any
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produce any documentation, such as a treaty, giving express
authorization from Congress for jurisdictional rights to the land,
the tribe did not have such a right. The Court held that this
easement, acquired for the State's purposes, was non-Indian
land held in fee simple by the State.2 6 Under the Montana
Rule, the tribe would not have authority to hear the case unless
one of two exceptions applied. 287
The first exception states if a nonmember has entered into a
consensual relationship with the tribe, such as a contractual or
business agreement, the tribe has jurisdiction over the
nonmember. 288 The first exception was found not to apply
because it was determined Fredricks did not have a consensual
relationship with the tribe within the meaning of the
exception.28 9 The Court found that the meaning of consensual
relationship had to do with business relationships with tribal
members, not family or residential relationships. 290 Therefore,
because both parties were not sufficiently connected with the
tribe, the exception did not apply.291
The second exception, which would give the tribe
jurisdiction when the activities of a nonmember "threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe," was held not to
apply.292 While the Court acknowledged that reckless driving
threatened the health or welfare of the tribe, it foreclosed the
idea that the threat to public safety could be used to establish
jurisdiction over nonmembers. 293 The Court asserted that the
second exception would only be available when the state
interfered with a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction over conduct
which would endanger internal tribal relations or tribal self-
government.294 Since tribal relations were not threatened, and a
regular highway automobile accident does not affect the political
integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,
damage to the right-of-way, which may be occasioned by such crossings.
Id. at 455. The court found that this was not enough of a reservation to qualify as a
right to exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way. Id.
286. Id. at 456.
287. Id. at 456-59.
288. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981).
289. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
293. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458.
294. Id. at 458-59.
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the Court held that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction to
hear the case.295
Lastly, the Court inserted a footnote that added an
exception to the Tribal Exhaustion Rule. When it is clear that no
federal grant authorizes the tribal jurisdiction over nonmember
conduct on land covered by the Montana Rule, then the
exhaustion requirement must give way.296 The reason is that
comity would not be served by continuing a case over which the
tribe has no jurisdiction.297 To aid in future cases, the court
outlined situations in which the second exception would apply:
1) an adoption proceeding where all of the parties were tribal
members; and 2) a merchant seeking payment for goods against
tribal members.298
The Strate decision did three things. First, it broadened the
language of the Montana Rule to include cases which dealt with
adjudicatory authority. 299 In the past, the Montana Rule was
only applied to issues of regulatory or legislative authority.300
Second, it narrowed the language of the second exception to the
Montana Rule. Now, the Rule does not apply to actions that
threaten public safety. Instead, the exception only applies to
internal tribal relations and a narrow sense of tribal self-
government. 301 Third, the Court created another exception to
the Exhaustion Rule, thereby limiting the full adjudication of a
claim in tribal courts to a further extent.30 2 Now, anytime a case
might fall under the Montana Rule, the party can take it
directly to the federal district courts.
295. Id. at 589.
296. Id. at 459-60 n.14.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 458.
299. Id. at 453.
300. Arron Duck, Note, Indians: Modern Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian
Parties: The Supreme Court Takes Another Bite Out of Tribal Sovereignty in Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 740 (1998). Adjudicatory authority is described
as the power of the court to hear the type of case that is then before it. Regulatory or
legislative authority is the power to apply tribal laws to conduct occurring in tribal
lands.
301. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
302. Id. at 459-60, n.14.
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IV. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY V. RED WOLF
A. Factual Background and Allegations of the Complaint
On November 22, 1993, Beverly Nadine Red Wolf and
Chantina Reney Red Horse were passengers in an automobile
being driven by Regina Ann Bull Tail on Big Horn County Road
No. 59 within the Crow Indian Reservation. 3 3  All were
members of the Crow Tribe. 304 The road was owned and
maintained by the Crow Tribe and crossed Burlington
Northern's railroad tracks.30 5
As the car Was driven across the tracks, it became stuck on
the tracks. 30 6 While the women tried to free the car, a train
rushed toward them. The train did not stop for the car. All
persons in the car died as a result of the collision. 30 7
The heirs of Beverly Red Wolf and Regina Bull Tail brought
an action for wrongful death in the Crow Tribal Court.308 The
complaint alleged the women's deaths were caused by
Burlington Northern's negligent act of leaving the crossing in an
unsafe and defective condition.30 9 They alleged the train
conductor failed to signal or slow the train in any way before the
collision, although the car was in plain view for at least 1200
feet.310 On January 25, 1996, the Crow court found Burlington
Northern liable for the wrongful death of both women and
awarded each of the five estates (hereinafter, "Estates") $50
million dollars in compensatory damages, totaling $250 million
dollars. 311
B. Procedural History
Burlington Northern was required to post a bond for a stay
of execution while it appealed the tribal court's judgment.
Burlington Northern filed a motion with Crow tribal court to
303. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, No 96-17, slip op. at 1 (D. Mont. Feb. 15,
1996).
304. Id. at 2
305. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1062.
308. Id.
309. Red Wolf v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., Pl.'s 2nd Am. Compl. 8.
310. Id. 9.
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stay execution of the tribal court's judgment without the
necessity of posting the bond.312 The tribal court denied the
motion.3 13 Burlington Northern appealed this decision to the
Crow Court of Appeals who affirmed the decision of the tribal
court.
3 1 4
Before the Crow Court of Appeals ruled, Burlington
Northern filed a request for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) in federal district court to enjoin the Estates from
executing upon or attempting to enforce the judgment entered
by the tribal court.315 On February 15, 1996, the federal district
court granted the TRO and ordered the Crow court to enjoin the
Estates from executing the Crow court's judgment.31 6 The
district court then remanded the case back to the tribal court
holding that the district court proceedings were to be stayed
until the exhaustion of tribal remedies.317 Instead of appealing
to the Crow Court of Appeals, Burlington Northern appealed to
the Ninth Circuit.318
On January 29, 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court erred in granting the TRO stating that "at a
minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal
appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the
determinations of the lower tribal courts."3 19 In this case, the
Crow Court of Appeals was not given an opportunity to review
the Tribal court's judgment.3 20  Therefore, under National
Farmers, the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over
the Crow court.32' Burlington Northern appealed this decision to
the United States Supreme Court.322
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in one
paragraph, vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Strate
ruling.3 23 The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case back to




316. Red Wolf N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, No 96-17, slip op. at 1 (D. Mont. Feb. 15,
1996).
317. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d. at 869.
318. Id. at 868.
319. Id. at 870 (quoting, Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987)).
320. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d. at 870.
321. Id.
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the federal district court.324 The federal district court held that
exhaustion was not required under Strate.325  Burlington
Northern then filed a permanent injunction to enjoin the Estates
from enforcing the Crow court's ruling.326 The injunction was
granted by the district court, holding that exhaustion was
unnecessary and enjoined any further proceedings in the tribal
court. 327  The Estates appealed the federal district court's
decision to the Ninth Circuit.328
C. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Decision
On November 17, 1999, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Tribal Exhaustion Rule did not apply in this case.329 The court
listed four exceptions to the tribal exhaustion rule: 1) an
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass
or is conducted in bad faith; 2) the action is patently violative of
express jurisdictional prohibitions; 3) exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge the
court's jurisdiction; or 4) it is plain that no federal grant
provides for tribal governance of nonmembers' conduct on land
covered by the Montana Rule.330 The court held that the last
exception applied to this case, therefore, there was no need for
Burlington Northern to appeal within the tribal courts. 331
The court used the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning to determine whether the tribal court had jurisdiction
in this case when the railroad crossing was land ceded to the
railroad. 332 In Strate, the Supreme Court distinguished between
state highways and tribal roads saying that they did not intend
to express any opinion of the governing law.333 In Red Wolf, the
Ninth Circuit held that, for the same reasons the highway in
Strate was viewed as non-Indian fee land, the railroad in
question here is non-Indian fee land.334
The court explained that a 1889 Congressional right-of-way





329. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065.
330. Id. at 1062.
331. Id. at 1065-66.
332. Id. at 1062-63.
333. Id. at 1063 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997)).
334. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1063.
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granted to Burlington Northern's predecessor gave the railroad
an absolute interest in "the construction, operation and
maintenance of its railroad, telegraph, and telephone line
through the lands set apart for the use of the Crow Indians."33 5
As in Strate, Congress acted within its plenary power 336 to
bestow rights to a parcel of land upon a non-Indian party,
thereby limiting the tribe's rights to the same land.337
The Estates argued that since the tribal road crossed the
easement, the crossing is tribal land under the Montana Rule.338
The court disagreed, stating that the fact that the railroad
crossed a tribal road did not mean that the easement became
tribal land at the crossing.339 Under the Congressionally
granted right-of-way, the Tribe did not reserve the power to
exercise jurisdiction over the right-of-way.340 Therefore, the
Crow Tribe has no jurisdictional power.341
Additionally, the Estates argued that the tribe's power to
tax the crossing gives the tribe the power to adjudicate civil
matters arising from the crossing.342 The court disagreed stating
the power to tax is broader than the power to adjudicate a
matter, therefore, the right to tax is not dispositive to the issue
of jurisdiction.343 The true threshold test to determine if the
tribe has the right to adjudicate is whether Congress has given
express authorization to the tribes. 344 Since there is no sign of
express congressional authorization granting the tribes the right
to obtain civil jurisdiction over the crossing, the railroad
crossing is non-Indian fee land.345
Next, the court examined whether the exceptions of the
Montana Rule applied to the case at hand.346  The first
exception, that there must be a consensual relationship, was
335. Id. at 1063 (quoting Pub. L. No. 50-134 § 1, 25 Stat. 660 (1889)).
336. LYONS, supra note 5, at 334 (1992). Plenary power is described as the
evolution, through case law and Acts of Congress, of the idea that an Act of Congress
supercedes any Indian treaty provision. It was created in the late 1880's after Congress
passed an act terminating their ability to make treaties with tribes. Id.






343. Id. at 1063-64.
344. Id. at 1063.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1064.
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deemed not to apply.347 The rule states that a tribe retains some
forms of civil jurisdiction if "a Tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing or other means, the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or it members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other
arrangements. " 3 4 8
The Estates argued that a consensual relationship existed
because Congress did not have the power to grant the right-of-
way without tribal consent. 349 The court stated that this is
correct, but only because Congress allowed the President to
require tribal consent at his discretion as a condition for
granting the right-of-way. 350 In Strate, the court found this was
simply Congressional policy, and did not limit Congressional
power in any way.351 Therefore, Congress had a right to transfer
ownership of the Crow land without the consent of the Crow
tribe. Thus, the court argued, there was no consensual
relationship. 352
The second exception examined by the court allows tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers when their conduct "threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."35 3 The Estates
claimed that the women's deaths deprived the tribe of potential
council members, teachers and babysitters.354 However, in
Strate, the Court found that an interest in public safety, and the
life of a tribal member, is not enough to satisfy the second
exception.3 55 The court rejected the Estates argument that the
special force of the interconnected tribal culture results in tribal
harm if even one member is lost. 356 Since the Estates failed to
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66.).
349. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1064.
350. Id. (citing § 3, 25 Stat. 660 (Emphasis added)).
351. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1064 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454
(1997).
352. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1064. It seems the Court is saying that it is OK that
Congress did not get the consent of the tribes before taking away their land. In fact, the
court states it will uphold the Unites States act of taking the land without payment.
353. Id. at 1064 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.).
354. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065.
355. Id. at 1065 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 458-9.). This goes to the importance of
such people in a tribal community. By failing to recognize the importance of the roles of
tribal members, the court failed to recognize the value of tradition tribal roles. Instead,
the court held the tribe accountable to the test of what are important social values in the
United States. This fails to promote the social policy of advancing the tribal community.
356. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065.
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plead any other damages, the second exception was not
satisfied.357 Therefore, the court ruled that the district court
was correct in ruling that the Crow court did not have
jurisdiction to hear this case.358
V. How THE COURT FAILED To DISTINGUISH RED WOLF,
THOUGH IT COULD HAVE EASILY DONE SO
The Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish Red Wolf from
Strate. In doing so, the court has effectively altered the factors
of the Strate Test, refusing to distinguish between an easement
purchased with a contract in 1970 and an easement taken by
treaty in 1889. It also failed to recognize that the tribe was
protected by a statute and failed to interpret the two exceptions
to the Montana Rule in ways that would promote tribal
sovereignty.
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Strate decision set up a
five part test: 1) there was legislation creating the right-of-way;
2) whether the right-of-way was acquired with the consent of the
tribe; 3) whether the tribe had reserved the right to exercise
dominion and control over the right-of-way; 4) whether the land
was open to the public; and 5) whether the right-of-way was
under state control."359 The Ninth Circuit did away with the last
two of the five factors. The railroad easement was not open to
public use, only use by the railroad, and the right-of-way was
not under state control.
First, the highway in Strate was used for public
transportation.360 In contrast, the railroad crossing in Red Wolf
was an easement not used by the state, but by a private
company, Burlington Northern.361 The train tracks were not
being used for public transportation since Burlington Northern
does not have passenger service.3 62 This is important because
the policy behind the ruling in Strate was that unsuspecting
nonresidents of the reservation driving along the highway would
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Big Horn Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Adam, 219 F.3d 944, 950, (citing Montana Dep't of
Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1999)).
360. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43.
361. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1062.
362. BNSF Company Profile (visited July 7, 2001)
<http::/www.bnsf'commedia/html/company-profile.html> This is a profile of the
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not realize they could be brought to tribal court for driving on a
state road within the reservation. This policy was to protect
such people. In Red Wolf, there were not any unsuspecting non-
Indians to protect. Based on the amount of cases between the
railroad and the tribes, it is fair to say that the railroad is well
aware of the possibility of being taken to tribal court.363
The second part of the test that was not applied by the court
was the requirement that an easement be state maintained. In
Red Wolf, the easement was not state maintained, but
maintained by Burlington Northern for Burlington Northern's
purposes.364 In Strate, the fact that the highway was state
owned and maintained went to the same policy of protecting an
unsuspecting nonmember from tribal court. The court could
have easily distinguished Red Wolf by maintaining the factors in
Strate. It is troubling that the Ninth Circuit is not following the
United States Supreme Court.
Aside from not altering Strate, the court could have
distinguished Red Wolf on other grounds. First, unlike the
highway in Strate, there was a statute that protected the rights
of Indians when a railroad easement is granted on the land. 365
The court should have held that in cases in which the rights of
the tribe are protected by a statute the relevant tribal court
maintains jurisdiction to hear the case. This holding would
have allowed the tribes the power to enforce rulings against
private defendants such as railroad companies. As a matter of
policy, the tribe should be able to force private defendants such
as railroad companies to maintain the crossings or other
easements on their reservations.
Second, the Ninth Circuit held that neither of the exceptions
to the Montana Rule applied to Red Wolf. With a slightly
broader reading, either one of the exceptions could have easily
been satisfied. The first exception states that a consensual
relationship is established through contract and business
363. Westlaw search conducted on June 18, 2001 found 400 documents where
Burlington Northern had been a party to a law suit. Four hundred (400) is Westlaw's
automatic shut off point. There are probably many more cases with Burlington Northern
as a party. This search was conducted under party name "Burlington Northern Railroad
Company" in the federal court database (ALLFEDS).
364. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1062-63. The court believed this argument did not hold
because the tribes failed to reserve dominion or control over the right-of-way when the
right-of-way was created, in 1889.
365. Id. at 1063. (citing §3, 25 Stat. 660) (operation of such railroad shall be
conducted with due regard for the right of the Indians).
376 Vol. 62
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agreements.366 The Ninth Circuit held that because the Crow
tribe did not consent to the land being taken away, there was no
consensual relationship. 367 This is illogical. The Supreme Court
has stated that the purposes of creating jurisdictional rules are
to preserve and protect Indian sovereignty. 368 However, to
interpret the rule, the Ninth Circuit used the concept of plenary
power, which allowed Congress to destroy Indian sovereignty. 369
If the court is supposed to follow the language of the United
State Supreme Court, and retain and protect sovereignty, then
why did it use plenary power?
The only logical answer is that the court is saying one thing
and doing another. The Ninth Circuit should have advanced the
purpose of the Montana Rule to promote Indian sovereignty by
adding a third exception to the Montana Rule, encompassing
land that was taken without the consent of the tribes and given
to non-Indians. The court could have also used the rule found in
many tribal cases, and given deference to the understanding of
the tribes at the time the right-of-way was created.370
The court's narrow reading of the second exception is even
more illogical. This exception was created for the purpose of
allowing tribes to protect their tribal interests - the political
integrity, economic security and the health and welfare of the
tribal members on the reservation-from non-Indian actions. 371
In Red Wolf, the Congressional statute that granted the railroad
company the easement stated that it was the railroad's
responsibility to maintain all of the crossings and stations
within the easement. 372 Because of the railroad's alleged failure
to do this, the crossing on the Crow reservation became unsafe
and three Crow women died. The Estates claimed that the
women's deaths deprived the tribe of potential council members,
366. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
367. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1063.
368. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845. 856
(1985).
369. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1064.
370. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (in construing
Indian treaties, courts should "look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty"). United States v. Shoshone Tribes, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938), (ambiguous
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians). See also, McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) and, Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675
(1912).
371. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
372. Pub. L. No. 50-134 § 1, 25 Stat. 660 (1889).
2001
39
Griffith: Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Red Wolf
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2001
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
teachers and babysitters. 373 Because of the particularly close
nature of the Crow tribe, such a loss struck to the heart of their
community. There is little question, from the view of the tribe's
concept of tribal welfare, that the unsafe condition of the
railroad posed an imminent threat to the health and welfare of
the tribe.
However, the Ninth Circuit held that this case did not
satisfy the second exception. The Supreme Court found that the
exception would be too broad if courts allowed for the threat to
public safety to satisfy the exception. 374 This analysis of public
safety was established in Strate, in which there was a normal
collision of two cars on the highway.375 There was no evidence
that the state was negligent in maintaining the road, thereby
creating an additional danger.37 6 The Court said that Strate was
just a simple case of an everyday threat to public welfare, a
typical car accident. 37 7 In its dicta, the Court suggested that it
was this type of threat to public welfare that would not satisfy
the exception. 378 Red Wolf is not the normal case.
In Red Wolf, Burlington Northern's negligence created an
uncommon threat to public safety. It is not often that a car will
become hung up on the railroad tracks because the tracks are
poorly maintained. Nor is it normal that a train will not slow
down when a car, stopped on the tracks, is in plain view for a
great distance.379 This is not the type of public safety threat the
Supreme Court was addressing in Strate. The Ninth Circuit
should have taken a closer look at Strate and distinguished Red
Wolf on the basis that this was an uncommon threat to public
safety and tribal welfare.
The Ninth Circuit held that an easement granting highway
rights is exactly the same as an easement granting railroad
rights because plenary power to grant the land exists in both
situations.380  The reality is that there is an important
distinguishing feature between the two. The easement in Strate
was bought in 1970. The easement in Red Wolf was taken by
treaty in 1889. The two are vastly different from each other.
373. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065.
374. Id. (interpreting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 447 (1997).
375. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.
376. See generally Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Red Wolfv. Burlington N. R.R. Co., Pl.'s 2nd Am. Compl. 9.
380. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000).
378 Vol. 62
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The last thing the court did was fail to enforce the Tribal
Exhaustion Rule. The rule states that the federal district court
must wait until all available remedies have been exhausted in
the tribal court system before review.381 This policy was based
on Congress' commitment "to a policy of supporting tribal self-
government and self-determination." 38 2 Instead of following the
Tribal Exhaustion Rule, the court created another exception to
the rule. Now tribal exhaustion is not required when "tribal
court jurisdiction does not exist under Montana and Strate."38 3
By refusing to enforce the tribal exhaustion rule, the court failed
to support tribal self-government. By creating another
exception, the court eroded self-government.
VI. Is THE REASON BEHIND THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION A
PROBLEM OF ADHERING To ANTIQUATED PUBLIC POLICY?
The Ninth Circuit's legal analysis of the federal
government's power is technically correct under common law.
Congress does have the right to grant land without consent
based upon the Plenary power granted to Congress in the late
1800's.384 The courts have the right to interpret Montana and
the Exhaustion Rule as narrowly or broadly as they wish. There
are no checks, as there are in the Constitution or current
legislation, that expressly state how to interpret rules of tribal
jurisdiction. Although current legislation speaks broadly of "a
policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-
determination,"385 the courts and Congress are free to create
rules that they see as supporting this policy.
The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that limiting
the jurisdiction of Indians over non-Indians does not conflict
with the government's policy of protecting Indian sovereignty,
since the policy only has to do with protecting the right of the
tribe to try tribal matters (e.g. tribe adoptions). 38 6 However, in
past cases, the Court has stated that tribal sovereignty is a
much broader theory, covering safety, welfare, contractual
relations and even tribal self-government. 38 7 A closer look at
381. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
(1985).
382. Id. at 856.
383. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d at 1065-66 n.17-18.
384. Id. at 1064.
385. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
386. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 452 (1997).
387. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
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Red Wolf shows that the narrow reading of the Montana Rule
established by the Supreme Court has tied the hands of the
tribes so tightly, they can no longer protect the welfare and
safety of the tribe. This result does not reflect the social policy
to which the majority of people in Montana adhere.
One of the duties that most courts always apply to their
rulings is to make the interpretation of the law reflect the
realities of societal thought. This is even more apparent with
Indian Law. Looking back on the history, it is readily apparent
that the laws passed by Congress, and the cases decided by the
court, directly reflected the societal needs of the time.388 When
the Constitution was created, the tribes were treated as
sovereign nations. 38 9 The societal policy was two fold: 1) there
was no need for the land at the time because the population of
the United States was small; and 2) the United States wanted to
remain at peace with the tribes, and even procure their aid,
since the United States was already in the middle of a war with
England.390
This policy changed when the United States population
began to grow. The societal policy toward the Indians shifted to
the removal of Indians from the lands that "non-savages" needed
to raise god-fearing families, and assimilating those savages into
God-fearing people. 391 From assimilation, there have been many
societal shifts, including the 1960's and 70's in which Indian
sovereignty became an important part of the Civil Rights
Movement. 392 People were ashamed of how they had treated the
American Indian population.
It is obvious that courts are still interpreting tribal
jurisdiction based on society's view of Native American relations
in the 1800's rather than today. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Red Wolf was based on the ability of Congress, in the late 1800's,
to take Indian land without the permission of the Indians.393
Society, specifically Montanans, does not stand for this today.
At a recent Senate hearing held in Montana on tribal
jurisdiction, there was an outcry by the people of Montana,
Indians and non-Indians, against a bill that would have
565 (1981).
388. See discussion supra Part II.
389. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 58-59.
390. Id. at 58.
391. Id. at 128-29.
392. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 180-88.
393. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
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eliminated tribal civil jurisdiction.394 Many non-Indians who
owned property in fee simple on the reservation were baffled as
to why the government had already taken away the right of the
tribe to adjudicate civil matters over them.395  They were
horrified at the proposed bill that would have eliminated all civil
jurisdiction in the tribe. One family wrote, "We have found the
[Confederated Salish and Kootenai] tribe to be trustworthy [and]
sympathetic to our plea."396 Another wrote, "there are many
non-Indians here who regard the presence of the tribes not as a
problem, but a great richness, not as something to hate, but to
love. We believe jurisdiction can be worked out in a far less
acrimonious manner."397 All of the newspaper editorials were
unequivocally against this bill.398 One was titled, "We need
Sovereignty, not Racism. '399 Out of the thousands of speeches,
letters, and e-mails submitted to the hearing committee, some
supported the bill, while thousands were against it.400 Most of
the people who supported United States Senator Conrad Burns
(R-MT) only supported his attempt to end the jurisdictional
problems that courts have created, not the actual bill.40 1
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Red Wolf failed to reflect the
societal changes of the last 50 years when it further encroached
upon tribal jurisdiction by holding that a railroad crossing falls
within the Montana Rule.4 0 2 The court also failed in its analysis
when it held that neither of the two exceptions to the rule
applied to the Red Wolf case. 40 3 Not only was this decision
antiquated, but it was illogical as well.
VII. THE EFFECTS OF RED WOLF ON THE COURTS
Already, the effects of Red Wolf can be seen. A Montana
case, Big Horn County Electric Cooperative, Incorporated v.
394. See generally, Jurisdictional Issues: Hearing before the Committee on Indian
Affairs before the United States Senate, 105th Cong. (1998). Hereinafter referred to as
"Senate Hearing." This is an incredible cumulation of personal views and writing on the
subject of Indian jurisdiction.
395. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 394.
396. Id. at 58.
397. Id. at 1319.
398. Id. at 51-2, 60-73, 210-19, 291-3 and 834.
399. Id. at 72.
400. See generally id., supra note 394.
401. Id.
402. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000).
403. Id. at 1064-5.
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Adams, 4 4 using the court's logic in Red Wolf, held the Crow tribe
does not have the right to tax property within the reservation if
it is held in fee simple by a non-member. 4 5
In that case, Big Horn Electric held property in fee simple
within the Crow reservation boundaries. The property was used
as a right-of-way to wire all of the Crow customers and supply
them with electricity. 40 6 The Crow tribal counsel adopted a
resolution that assessed a 3% tax on the full fair market value of
all "utility property" within the boundaries of the reservation. 40 7
Section 219 of the resolution prohibited the utility from passing
the amount of the tax onto its Crow customers.408 Instead, the
tax payer is required to "treat the tax as 'an imbedded cost or
revenue requirement."' 40 9
In December 1993, the tribe sent Big Horn the first bill for
the tax.410 In April 1994, Big Horn began charging its Crow
customers in order to pay the tax. The charge was listed as the
"Crow utility tax" on the bill. It charged each customer the pro
rata share of the utility tax.411
The tribe filed an action in tribal court to enjoin Big Horn
from passing the tax to its Crow customers. 412 Big Horn
counterclaimed, challenging the legality of the prohibition and
alleging that the tribe had surpassed its regulatory jurisdiction
when it taxed land held in fee simple by nonmembers. 413 The
tribal court granted summary judgment for the tribe and issued
a permanent injunction that prohibited the utility from passing
the tax onto the Crow customers.414 Big Horn appealed to the
Crow Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's
holding.415
Big Horn filed a complaint in federal district court, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.416  The Defendants were
composed of tribal members-including the tax commissioner,
404. 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
405. Id. at 954.







413. Id. at 948-49.
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the members of the Crow Public Utility Commission, and the
judges of the Crow tribal court.417 Big Horn also sought to
recover all of the unlawfully paid taxes. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Big Horn, holding that
the tribe could not assess a tax on a federally granted right of
way.418 The district court ordered a permanent injunction,
enjoining the tribe from any future assessment of the tax.419
They also ordered the tribe to refund all of the utility tax
collected thus far.42°
The tribe appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The major issue in
this case was whether the land held by the utility was the
equivalent to land held in fee simple.421 The court looked at five
factors, established in Strate v. A-1 Contractors and clarified in
Burlington Northern v. Red Wolf
1)the legislation creating the right-of-way; 2) whether the right-of-
way was acquired with the consent of the tribe; 3) whether the
tribe had reserved the right to exercise dominion and control over
the right-of-way; 4) whether the land was open to the public; and
5) whether the right-of-way was under state control.422
These five factors are used to test whether the congressionally
granted right of way is the equivalent of land held in fee simple.
This test is referred to as the Strate Analysis.423
The court found that the first three factors easily applied to
the land. Big Horn's easements were created by the same
legislation that created the easements in Strate, therefore, the
legislation was fine.424 The tribe gave its consent, and it failed to
reserve the right to exercise dominion and control over the right-
of-way.425
The defendants argued that the utility's land was not open
to the public, nor was it under state control.426 The court
agreed. However, the court determined that the two factors did
not have to be applied to this case based on Red Wolf.427 In Red
417. Id. at 949 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)).
418 Id.
419. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 949.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 950 (citing Montana Dep't of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
1999).
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Wolf, the land held by the railroad was not public, nor was it
held by the state, but it was still the equivalent of a fee simple.
The court found that the facts in this case were
indistinguishable from the facts in Red Wolf. Therefore, the
court found that, like Red Wolf, the last two factors in Strate do
not apply in this case. 428 If the court in Red Wolf had ruled to
distinguish the case on one or both of these two factors, Big
Horn would have been decided differently. This is the crux of
the court's decision in Red Wolf.
The defendants argued that unlike Red Wolf, this case deals
with a tribe's legislative and regulatory authority.429 Therefore,
the Strate analysis should not even apply to this case. 430 The
court found the difference meaningless. According to Strate, "a
tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction."431 The court read this to imply that the Strate
Analysis is equally applicable to cases dealing with a tribe's
regulatory and legislative authority, as well as adjudicative
jurisdictional authority.432
The court held that the land was held in fee simple by Big
Horn.433 It went on to conclude that according to the Montana
Rule, the tribal courts do not have the regulatory and legislative
authority to tax the property held by Big Horn.434 To come to
this conclusion, the court held that neither exception to the
Montana Rule applied.435
Regarding the first exception, the court held that Big Horn
obviously created a consensual relationship with the tribe by
entering into contractual relationships with tribal members in
order to supply electricity.436 However, the court held the
exception only allowed the tribe to tax the activities of the entity,
not the property of the entity. Therefore, the tax did not fall
within the exception. 437
In regards to the second exception, the tribe argued that the




431. Id. (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997)).
432. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 950.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 951-52.
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tax.438 The tax goes to provide necessary services for the tribe,
therefore, the tribes' welfare relies upon the tax.439 The court
found that the defendants reading of the exception was far too
broad. In the other cases, the court has held that the exception
should be construed only very narrowly." 0 If the court allowed
the tax to fall under the second exception then "Montana's
second exception would effectively swallow Montana's main rule,
because virtually any tribal tax would fall under the second
exception."" 1 This would conflict with the Supreme Court's
statement that tribal jurisdiction is limited. Therefore, under
the Montana Rule and the Strate Analysis, the tribe does not
have the authority to tax the property of Big Horn."
2
The court did one small favor for the tribe. It reversed the
district courts decision that the tribe had to reimburse Big Horn
for all of the taxes collected." 3 However, the overall affect this
case may have on all of the tribes in Montana is overwhelming.
The tribes rely on this money for a fair amount of income. Many
social programs throughout the Ninth Circuit are funded by
such taxes on utility lines. This does not hold with the policies
of self-determination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit should have distinguished Red Wolf from
other United States Supreme Court cases. By not
distinguishing Red Wolf, the Ninth Circuit changed the
precedent set forth by the Court. The results are unacceptable.
Only by keeping to tenets which allow tribes jurisdiction over
important tribal matters can the courts truly say they are
promoting self determination.
Tribal self-determination can be achieved, but only by
looking at our nation as a whole, not just through the eyes of
middle-upper class America. This would require the courts to
take a closer look at what it means to be a member of a tribe.
Only by obtaining an understanding of the tribal community
will the courts get a sense of what really might affect the
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1997); County of
Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998)).
441. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951.
442. Id. at 951-52.
443. Id. at 954.
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"political integrity, economic security, health or welfare," of a
tribe.444 Until each judge takes this look, any ruling they make
is made on the basis of his/her own knowledge or experience.
Thus, the ruling will promote each judge's idea of what a tribe
should be, not what a tribe really is. This is assimilation;
making the tribe fit the judge's own experience of community.
The members of the Ninth Circuit are no different from the
others. This is shown by the many different options the court
had to distinguish Red Wolf from other tribal jurisdiction cases.
First, an easement purchased by contract in the 1970's was
significantly different from an easement taken by treaty in 1889.
Second, unlike the highway in Strate, the railroad easement was
not under state control. Third, the Crow tribe was protected by
a statute. Fourth, the first or second exceptions of the Montana
Rule could have been read in slightly broader terms. For the
first exception, there was an implicit consensual relationship
between the tribe and government when the land was taken by
treaty. Another option was to create a third exception to the
Montana Rule in cases where a tribe was not given the option to
consent to the taking. Under the second exception, it is easy to
see that the tracks posed an imminent threat to the health or
welfare of the tribe since three tribal members died because of
the failure to maintain the tracks. Last, a car becoming stuck
on the railroad tracks is distinguishable from a common public
welfare risk of a collision on a highway.
Although the court could have done any one of the number
of things mentioned above, it chose not to. Instead, it broadened
the Montana Rule, and allowed a case which heavily involved
the Crow tribe to be removed outside their jurisdiction.
Therefore, in Red Wolf, the Ninth Circuit continued the
downward slide of tribal self-determination in the United States.
It is apparent from Big Horn that the trend is going to continue
unless drastic measures are taken by the federal court system or
by Congress. The various members of the courts should awake
to the true effects of their decisions, and take steps to stop their
newest form of assimilating tribes into their idea of community.
444. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
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